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Abstract
This paper studies a resource allocation problem introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou. The
scenario is modelled as a multiple-player game in which each player selects one of a finite number of
known resources. The cost to the player is the total weight of all players who choose that resource,
multiplied by the “delay” of that resource. Recent papers have studied the Nash equilibria and social
optima of this game in terms of the L∞ cost metric, in which the social cost is taken to be the maximum
cost to any player. We study the L1 variant of this game, in which the social cost is taken to be the sum of
the costs to the individual players, rather than the maximum of these costs. We give bounds on the size
of the coordination ratio, which is the ratio between the social cost incurred by selfish behavior and the
optimal social cost; we also study the algorithmic problem of finding optimal (lowest-cost) assignments
and Nash Equilibria. Additionally, we obtain bounds on the ratio between alternative Nash equilibria for
some special cases of the problem.
∗Submitted for journal publication. This work was partially supported by the IST Program of the EU under contract numbers
IST-1999-14186 (ALCOM-FT) and IST-1999-14036 (RAND-APX).
1 Introduction
This paper studies the resource allocation problem introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [7]. In
this problem, we are given a collection of resources such as computer servers, printers, or communication
links, each of which is associated with a “delay”1. We are also given a collection of tasks, each of which
is associated with a “weight” corresponding to its size. Each task chooses a resource. A given resource is
shared between its tasks in such a way that each of these tasks incurs a cost corresponding to the time until
the resource has completed its work. For example, the task might model a routing request and the resources
might model parallel links of a network. If routing requests are broken into packets and these are sent in a
round-robin fashion, each request will finish at (approximately) the time that the link finishes its work.
We assume that each task chooses its resource in a selfish manner, minimizing its own cost. Follow-
ing [7] we are interested in determining the social cost of this selfish behavior. Previous work on this
problem has measured “social cost” in terms of the L∞ metric — that is, the longest delay incurred by any
task. Our measure of social cost is the L1 metric – that is, the average delay (over tasks). This is sometimes
called the utilitarian interpretation of social welfare, and is a standard assumption in the multi-agent system
literature, for example [3, 11, 15]. In many settings, the average delay may be a better measure of the quality
of a solution than the very worst delay. Thus, the L1 metric is quite natural. This metric was also used in
the model of [13] in the setting of infinitely many tasks.
We give bounds on the size of the coordination ratio, which is the ratio between the social cost incurred
by selfish behavior and the optimal social cost [7]; we also study the algorithmic problem of finding optimal
(lowest-cost) assignments. By an assignment we mean the set of choices of resource that are made by each
task. For the case of identical resources or identical tasks we obtain bounds on the ratio between alternative
Nash equilibria.
Our results show that the L1 metric behaves very different to the L∞ metric. In the case of the L∞
metric, there always exists an optimal assignment that is also Nash, but the costs of different Nash assign-
ments can differ a lot. In the case of the L1 metric, the costs of any optimal assignment and the cost of the
minimum-cost Nash assignment can be arbitrarily far away from each other, but in a lot of cases the costs of
different Nash assignments can differ only by a constant factor.
1.1 The model
Here is the model from [7] (which is introduced in the context of networks, as mentioned above). We are
given a set R of m resources with delays d1 ≤ . . . ≤ dm. We are also given a set T of n tasks with weights
w1, . . . , wn. We assume that wi ≥ 1 for all i, and we let W =
∑n
i=1 wi denote the total task load. Each
task will select one resource. Thus, an assignment is a vector A = (A1, . . . , An) which assigns the ith
task to resource Ai ∈ R. (In the language of game theory, an assignment associates each task with a “pure
strategy”.2) Let A = {1, . . . ,m}n denote the set of all assignments. The load of resource ℓ in assignment A
is defined to be
L(ℓ,A) = dℓ
∑
i∈T :Ai=ℓ
wi.
The load of task i in assignment A is L(Ai, A). Finally, the (social) cost of assignment A is given by
C(A) =
∑
i∈T
L(Ai, A).
1The delay is the reciprocal of the quantity commonly called the “speed” or “capacity” in related work. It is convenient to work
in terms of the delay, as defined here, because this simplifies our results.
2[7] also considers mixed strategies. See Section 1.3.
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The notion of “selfish behavior” that we study comes from the game-theoretic notion of a Nash equi-
librium. An assignment A is a Nash equilibrium if and only if no task can lower its own load by changing
its choice of resource (keeping the rest of the assignment fixed). More formally, A is said to be a Nash
assignment if, for every task i and every resource ℓ, we have L(Ai, A) ≤ L(ℓ,A′), where the assignment A′
is derived from A by re-assigning task i to resource ℓ, and making no other change. We let N (T,R) denote
the set of all Nash assignments for problem instance (T,R). When the problem instance is clear from the
context, we refer to this as N . For a given problem instance, we study the coordination ratio from [7] which
is the ratio between the cost of the highest-cost Nash assignment and the cost of the lowest-cost assignment.
That is
maxN∈N C(N)
minA∈A C(A)
.
This ratio measures the extent to which the social cost increases if we use a worst-case Nash equilibrium
rather than an optimal assignment. We also study the ratio between the lowest cost of a Nash assignment and
the lowest cost of an (arbitrary) assignment and also the ratio between the lowest cost of a Nash assignment
and the highest cost of a Nash assignment.
Note that throughout the paper we study the average cost-per-task. The reader should not confuse this
with the average cost-per-resource. The latter is trivial to optimize (it is achieved by assigning all tasks to
the link with the lowest delay) but it is not natural.
1.2 Results
Section 2: Coordination Ratio in Terms of Task Weight Range
Theorem 2.5 in Section 2 bounds the coordination ratio in terms of the range over which the task weights
vary. In particular, suppose that all task weights wi lie in the range [1, wmax]. Then
maxN∈N C(N)
minA∈AC(A)
≤ 4wmax.
Several of our results focus on the special cases in which the resource delays are identical (Section 3) or
the task weights are identical (Section 4). The results are summarized as follows.
Section 3: Resources with Identical Delays
1. (Lemma 3.2) For every n, there is a problem instance with n tasks with weights in the range [1, n2]
for which
minN∈N C(N)
minA∈A C(A)
≥ n
5
.
Note that this is the ratio of the best Nash cost to the optimal cost of an assignment, hence it gives a
lower bound on the coordination ratio that is proportional to √wmax, where wmax is the ratio of largest
to smallest task weights. This lower bound should be contrasted with Theorem 2.5 which gives an
upper bound that is proportional to wmax. These two results show that it is variability of task weights,
as opposed to resource delays, that may lead to a big coordination ratio.
2. (Theorem 3.3) Nash assignments satisfy the following relation:
maxN∈N C(N)
minN∈N C(N)
≤ 3.
2
3. (Lemma 3.4) For every ǫ > 0, there is an instance satisfying
maxN∈N C(N)
minN∈N C(N)
≥ 5
3
(1− ǫ).
The size of the problem instance depends upon ǫ.
Section 4: Tasks with Identical Weights
Theorem 2.5 gives an upper bound of 4 for the coordination ratio in the case of identical weights. We also
have the following results.
1. (Lemma 4.6) For any ǫ > 0 there is a problem instance for which
minN∈N C(N)
minA∈A C(A)
≥ 4
3
− ǫ.
2. (Theorem 4.7) The lowest-cost and highest-cost Nash assignments satisfy:
maxN∈N C(N)
minN∈N C(N)
≤ 4
3
which is an exact result; we show that 4/3 is obtainable for some instance.
3. (Theorems 4.2 and 4.5) We give algorithms for finding a lowest-cost assignment and a lowest-cost
Nash assignment. These algorithms run in time O(mn).
Section 5: Finding social optima using dynamic programming
In Section 5 we show how dynamic programming can be used to find optimal assignments under the L1
metric, in either the identical-tasks case, or the identical-resources case. The algorithms extend to the case
where either the task sizes or the delays may take a limited set of values. This extension is used to give
approximation schemes for the cases where instead of a limit on the number of distinct values, we have a
limit on the ratio of largest to smallest values.
1.3 Alternative models and related work
There are two collections of work related to our paper. The first uses a similar model, but a different cost
function. The second uses a similar cost function, but a different model.
The model that we study was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [7], who initiated the study
of coordination ratios. They worked in the more general setting of mixed strategies. In a mixed strategy, in-
stead of choosing a resource Ai, task i chooses a vector (pi,1, . . . , pi,m) in which pi,j denotes the probability
with which task i will use resource j. A collection of mixed strategies (one strategy for each task) is a Nash
equilibrium if no task can reduce its expected cost by modifying its own probability vector. Unlike us, Kout-
soupias and Papadimitriou measure social cost in terms of the L∞ metric. Thus, the cost of a collection of
strategies is the (expected) maximum load of a resource (maximized over all resources). Their coordination
ratio is the ratio between the maximum cost (maximized over all Nash equilibria) divided by the cost of the
optimal solution. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou give bounds on the coordination ratio. These bounds are
improved by Mavronicolas and Spirakis [10], and by Czumaj and Vo¨cking [1] who gave an asymptotically
tight bound. Fotakis et al. [6] consider the same model. They study the following algorithmic problems:
constructing a Nash equilibrium, constructing the worst Nash equilibrium, and computing the cost of a given
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Nash equilibrium. For our purposes, we note that the existence of at least one pure Nash assignment (as de-
fined in Section 1.1) was also proven in [6]. Czumaj et al. [2] give further results for the model of [7] using
the L∞ metric for a wide class of so-called simple cost functions. They call a cost function simple if it de-
pends only on the injected load of the resources. They also show that for some families of simple monotone
cost functions, these results can be carried over to the L1 metric. These are qualitative results relating the
boundedness of the coordination ratio in terms of boundedness of the bicriteria ratio. The bicriteria ratio
describes by how many times the number of injected tasks must be decreased so that the worst case cost in
a Nash equilibrium cannot exceed the optimal cost for the original tasks. In contrast, here we are studying
quantative bounds on the coordination ratio for a special case of non-simple cost functions.
In [5] Gairing et al. study the combinatorial structure and computational complexity of extreme Nash
equilibria, i.e. equilibria that maximize or minimize the objective function. Their results provide substantial
evidence for the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture, which states that the worst case Nash equilib-
rium is the fully mixed Nash equilibrium where each user chooses each link with positive probability. They
also develop some algorithms for Nashification, which is the problem of transforming an arbitrary pure
strategy profile into a pure Nash equilibrium without increasing the social cost. In [4] Feldmann et al. give
a polynomial time algorithm for Nashification and a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for
computing a Nash equilibrium with minimum social cost. In [9] Lu¨cking et al. continue to study the Fully
Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture and report substantial progress towards identifying the validity. Note
that all these publications use the L∞ metric to measure the social cost.
Roughgarden and Tardos [13] study coordination ratios in the setting of traffic routing. A problem
instance specifies the rate of traffic between each pair of nodes in an arbitrary network. Each agent controls
a small fraction of the overall traffic. Like us, Roughgarden and Tardos use an L1 cost-measure. That is,
the cost of a routing is the sum of the costs of the agents. The model of Roughgarden and Tardos is in one
sense much more general than our model (from [7]) which corresponds to a two-node network with many
parallel links. However, most work in the model of [13] relies on the simplifying assumption that each
agent can split its traffic arbitrarily amongst different paths in the network. In our model, this assumption
would correspond to allowing a task to split itself between the resources, dividing its weight into arbitrary
proportions — a simplification which would make our problems trivial. In particular, this simplification
forces all Nash assignments to have the same L1 cost, which is not true in the unsplittable model that we
study. In fact, in [13] it is demonstrated that if agents are not allowed to split their traffic arbitrarily but each
chooses a single path on which to route their own traffic, then the cost of a Nash assignment can be arbitrarily
larger than an optimal (lowest-cost) assignment. This is in contrast to their elegant coordination ratio [13]
for the variant that they study. Even in our model, the splittable-task variant is useful as a proof device. In
Section 2, we use the splittable-task setting to derive a lower bound on the cost of Nash assignments in our
model. For other interesting results in the model of Roughgarden and Tardos, see [13] and [14].
Finally, we should contrast this work with [8] which (in the model from [7]) studies “quadratic social
cost”, a sum of individual costs weighted by the task weights. That measure of social cost is the same as
ours in the case where all task weights are equal, but in general leads to very different results for social
optima and coordination ratio, even in the special case of identical resources.
2 Coordination Ratio in Terms of Task Weight Range
Suppose that the weights lie in the range [1, wmax]. The purpose of this section is to prove Theorem 2.5,
which shows that the coordination ratio is at most 4wmax.
Definition 2.1 A fractional assignment AF for an instance (T,R) is a collection of real numbers ht(ℓ) for
t ∈ T, ℓ ∈ R, such that 0 ≤ ht(ℓ) ≤ 1 and
∑
ℓ∈R ht(ℓ) = 1 for all t ∈ T .
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If AF is a fractional assignment, the load of resource ℓ is defined as L(ℓ,AF ) = dℓ
∑
i∈T wihi(ℓ). The
cost of task i is defined as Ci(AF ) =
∑
ℓ∈R hi(ℓ)L(ℓ,A
F ) and the cost of AF is defined as C(AF ) =∑
i∈T Ci(A
F ).
An integral assignment is a fractional assignment where all the quantities ht(ℓ) are equal to 0 or 1. Note
that we reserve the notation A (or A(T,R) to denote the sets of tasks and resources) strictly for integral
assignments.
Define the throughput of resource set R to be D =∑ℓ∈R 1dℓ .
We use Definition 2.1 to provide a lower bound on the cost of any integral assignment for a given instance
(T,R). We start by giving a lower bound on the cost of a fractional assignment. The following lemma is
essentially the same as Lemma 2.5 of [13].
Lemma 2.2 If all tasks have weight 1, then the optimal fractional assignment AF,opt gives each resource a
load of n/D and therefore any task t has Ct(AF,opt) = n/D.
Proof: Let xℓ =
∑
i∈T hi(ℓ). From Definition 2.1, the load of resource ℓ is xℓdℓ. We have:∑
ℓ∈R
xℓ = n. (1)
Similar,
C(AF ) =
∑
i∈T
Ci(A
F ) =
∑
i∈T
∑
ℓ∈R
hi(ℓ)L(ℓ,A
F ) =
∑
i∈T
∑
ℓ∈R
hi(ℓ)dℓ
∑
j∈T
hj(ℓ)
where we have used wi = 1 in the expression for L(ℓ,AF ). Thus,
C(AF ) =
∑
i∈T
∑
ℓ∈R
hi(ℓ)xℓdℓ =
∑
ℓ∈R
∑
i∈T
hi(ℓ)xℓdℓ =
∑
ℓ∈R
xℓdℓ
∑
i∈T
hi(ℓ) =
∑
ℓ∈R
x2ℓdℓ.
Equation (1) gives a linear constraint on the xℓ values, and we have expressed C(AF ) in terms of the xℓ
values. To minimise C(AF ) subject to (1) we use the well-known method of Lagrange multipliers (see [12]).
This means that the gradient of C(AF ) and that of the function
∑
ℓ∈R xℓ must have the same direction:
∃Λ ∈ R such that ∇(C(AF )) = Λ∇
(∑
ℓ∈R
xℓ
)
i.e. (2d1x1, 2d2x2, . . . , 2dmxm) = (Λ,Λ, . . . ,Λ).
Hence, at the optimum we see that xℓ = Λ2dℓ for all ℓ. Using (1), we then find that xℓ =
n
Ddℓ
, and
L(ℓ,AF,opt) = xℓdℓ = n/D for all ℓ ∈ R. Finally, for any task i
Ci(A
F,opt) =
∑
ℓ∈R
hi(ℓ)L(ℓ,A
F,opt) =
∑
ℓ∈R
hi(ℓ)
n
D
=
n
D
∑
ℓ∈R
hi(ℓ) =
n
D
.
✷
The above result provides a useful lower bound on the cost of any integral assignment A. We make one
refinement for the lower bound: note that if m > n, then any Nash or optimal assignment will only use n
resources having smallest delays.3 Hence an instance (T,R) with m > n can be modified by removing the
m − n resources with largest delay. In what follows, we shall therefore make the assumption that n ≥ m.
We next proceed to give a bound on the coordination ratio for tasks having weights in the range [1, wmax].
We first give a definition and an observation that will be useful to us.
3If the number of resources is allowed to be large by comparison with the number of tasks, then the optimal fractional assignment
can be made artificially much lower than any integral assignment, by including a large number of resources with very large delays,
thereby inflating the value of D.
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Definition 2.3 Given a set R of m resources and a set of n ≥ m tasks, we say resource ℓ is fast provided
that dℓ ≤ 2n/D, otherwise ℓ is slow.
Given a set of tasks T , let T ∗ denote a set of tasks such that |T ∗| = |T | and each task t ∈ T ∗ has unit
weight. We first make an observation about the slow and fast resources for the optimal fractional assignment
AF,opt(T ∗, R).
Observation 2.4 For any sets T,R, in the optimal fractional assignment for the instance (T ∗, R) we have
∑
ℓ∈R;ℓ fast
∑
i∈T ∗
hi(ℓ) ≥ n/2.
Proof: Let AF,opt denote an optimal fractional assignment. First note that
∑
ℓ∈R
∑
i∈T ∗ hi(ℓ) = n.
Using Lemma 2.2 (and the definition of a “slow resource”) we find that in AF,opt(T ∗, R) each slow
resource ℓ satisfies
∑
i∈T ∗ hi(ℓ) ≤ 1/2. Since we assume n ≥ m, at most n resources are slow, so that∑
ℓ∈R;ℓ slow
∑
i∈T ∗ hi(ℓ) ≤ n/2. The result follows from
∑
ℓ∈R;ℓ fast
∑
i∈T ∗
hi(ℓ) =
∑
ℓ∈R
∑
i∈T ∗
hi(ℓ)−
∑
ℓ∈R;ℓ slow
∑
i∈T ∗
hi(ℓ).
✷
Here is our bound on the coordination ratio for tasks having weights in the range [1, wmax].
Theorem 2.5 Suppose (T,R) is a problem instance with n tasks having weights in the range [1, wmax] and
m resources. Then
max
N∈N
C(N) ≤ 4wmax min
A∈A
C(A).
Proof: Following our comments preceeding Definition 2.3 we again assume that n ≥ m. Let AF (T,R)
denote the set of all fractional assignments for the instance (T,R). As before, we let T ∗ denote the set of
unit-weight tasks, where |T ∗| = |T |. We first note that
min
A∈A(T,R)
C(A) ≥ min
AF∈AF (T,R)
C(AF ) ≥ min
AF∈AF (T ∗,R)
C(AF ) =
n2
D
. (2)
The last equality is an application of Lemma 2.2 to the instance (T ∗, R). We show that in any integral Nash
assignment N , all tasks i satisfy the inequality L(Ni, N) ≤ 4wmax(n/D). This would then imply that
max
N∈N
C(N) = max
N∈N
∑
i∈T
L(Ni, N) ≤ 4wmax
(
n2
D
)
.
This, together with (2), gives us the result.
Let N denote a Nash assignment. Suppose that under this assignment some resource j satisfies
L(j,N) > 4wmax
( n
D
)
.
We prove that N is not Nash, by finding an assignment N ′ (obtained from N ) by transferring one task from
resource j to some j′ such that
L(j′, N ′) ≤ 4wmax
( n
D
)
.
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We start by proving there exists a fast resource j′ such that L(j′, N) ≤ 2wmax( nD ). To prove this, suppose
for a contradiction that all fast resources ℓ satisfy
L(ℓ,N) > 2wmax
( n
D
)
. (3)
Let AF,opt denote an optimal fractional assignment for the instance (T ∗, R). We recall from Lemma 2.2 that
L(ℓ,AF,opt) = nD for all resources ℓ. Thus, if a fast resource ℓ satisfies (3), we must have L(ℓ,N)/dℓ >
2wmaxL(ℓ,A
F,opt)/dℓ. This means that
∑
i∈T ;Ni=ℓ
wi > 2wmax
∑
i∈T ∗
hi(ℓ) (4)
where hi(ℓ) are the values for the optimal fractional assignment AF,opt. However, from Observation 2.4 we
know that in AF,opt ∑
ℓ∈R;ℓ fast
∑
i∈T ∗
hi(ℓ) ≥ n
2
which, with Equation (4) implies
∑
ℓ∈R;ℓ fast
∑
i∈T :Ni=ℓ
wi >
n
2
(2wmax) = nwmax.
This is a contradiction since the left hand side of this inequality (which is at most the sum of weights in the
instance (T,R)) is at most nwmax. Since we have a contradiction, we instead conclude there exists a fast
resource j′ where
L(j′, N) ≤ 2wmax
( n
D
)
.
We now show how to construct N ′ from N , thereby proving that N was not a Nash assignment, a con-
tradiction. Recall since j′ is a fast resource, dj′ ≤ 2nD . We consider two cases for j′. Let k = L(j′, N)/dj′ .
If k ≤ wmax, then moving one task from resource j to resource j′ (to get the new assignment N ′), we find
that
L(j′, N ′) ≤ dj′(k + wmax) ≤ 2
( n
D
)
(wmax + wmax) ≤ 4wmax
( n
D
)
.
If instead k > wmax, then moving one task from j to j′ to get N ′, we find
L(j′, N ′) ≤ dj′(k + wmax) ≤ dj′ · 2k = 2L(j′, N) ≤ 4wmax
( n
D
)
.
In either case, we have shown that N is not a Nash assignment because we can move one task (currently
having a load greater than 4wmax( nD )) from resource j to resource j′ where it has a lower load. Thus, we
conclude that if N is a Nash assignment, then L(j,N) ≤ 4wmax
(
n
D
)
for all resources j, as desired to prove
the theorem. ✷
3 Resources with Identical Delay
In this section, we restrict our attention to problem instances with identical delays, i.e. d1 = d2 = · · · = dm.
If we examine the cost function we are using, we see that if all of the delays are identical, we can factor this
term from the cost. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that for all i, di = 1.
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Notation: Recall that W =
∑
t∈T wi denotes the total weight of tasks. Let Lavg be the average load on a
resource, that is, Lavg = 1m
∑
ℓ∈R L(ℓ,A) = W/m. Note in the case of identical (unit) delays, Lavg is the
same constant value for all assignments associated with a given problem instance (T,R).
The following observation will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Observation 3.1 Suppose N ∈ N . Every task i with wi > Lavg has its own resource (which is not shared)
in N .
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that task i shares a resource with task j. The load of task j is at least
wj +wi. There must be some resource whose load is at most the average load Lavg, and task j would prefer
to move to this resource, obtaining a new load of at most wj + Lavg. ✷
The next lemma shows that in the case of identical resources, the ratio between the cost of the minimum
(and, hence, any) Nash assignment and the lowest cost of any assignment can be arbitrarily large. In fact,
our example needs just two resources to obtain this result.
Lemma 3.2 For every n > 2, there is an instance having identical resources, and n tasks with weights in
the range [1, n2] for which the following holds:
min
N∈N
C(N) ≥ n
5
min
A∈A
C(A).
Proof: For our problem instance we take m = 2, d1 = d2 = 1, w1 = w2 = n2, and w3 = · · · = wn = 1.
Any assignment in which tasks 1 and 2 use the same resource is in A − N because one of these tasks
could move to decrease its own load. Thus, any N ∈ N will have tasks 1 and 2 on different resources,
which implies C(N) ≥ n3. On the other hand, minA∈A C(A) ≤ C(A∗), where A∗ is the assignment which
assigns tasks 1 and 2 to resource 1 and the other tasks to resource 2. C(A∗) = 4n2+(n− 2)(n− 2) ≤ 5n2.
Putting these facts together, for every N ∈ N ,
C(N) ≥ n
5
min
A∈A
C(A).
✷
Remark: The example from the lemma has wmax = n2 and wmin = 1, showing that in this case
C(N) ≥
√
wmax
5 minA∈A C(A). Thus, the bound of Theorem 2.5 needs to be some function of wmax. The
example in Section 5.3 of [13] gives an observation similar to Lemma 3.2 for the general-flow setting. The
example is a four-node problem instance with two agents. The latency functions may be chosen so that there
is a Nash equilibrium which is arbitrarily worse than the social optimum.
Lemma 3.2 shows that the cost of the best assignment and the cost of the best Nash assignment can be
arbitrarily far apart. On the other hand, we can show that the costs of different Nash assignments are close
to one another.
Theorem 3.3 For every instance with identical resources we have
max
N∈N
C(N) ≤ 3 min
N∈N
C(N).
Proof: We first reduce the case in which T contains a task with wi > Lavg to the case in which T does
not contain such a task. Let (T ′, R′) be a problem instance derived from (T,R) by removing a task i with
wi > Lavg and removing one resource. Then by Observation 3.1,
max
N∈N (T,R)
C(N) = wi + max
N∈N (T ′,R′)
C(N).
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Similarly,
min
N∈N (T,R)
C(N) = wi + min
N∈N (T ′,R′)
C(N).
Thus, to prove the theorem, we only need to show
max
N∈N (T,R)
C(N) ≤ 3 min
N∈N (T,R)
C(N)
for problem instances (T,R) in which every task has wi ≤ Lavg. Let (T,R) be such an instance. Consider
task i having weight wi. In a Nash assignment A, the load of task i satisfies
L(Ai, A) ≥ max{wi, Lavg/2} (5)
since all resources must have load at least Lavg/2. (If a resource has load less than Lavg/2 then there must
be a resource with load strictly larger than Lavg with at least 2 tasks on it, because of our assumption that
wt ≤ Lavg for all tasks t. Then one of the tasks on this heavily loaded resource would move to the other less
loaded one.) Since A is a Nash assignment, the load of task i satisfies
L(Ai, A) ≤ Lavg + wi. (6)
The ratio of the upper bound from (6) and the lower bound from (5) is at most 3, attained when wi =
Lavg/2. Hence the ratio between total costs (which is the ratio between sums of individual task costs) is
upper bounded by 3. ✷
The following lemma should be compared to Theorem 3.3.
Lemma 3.4 For every ǫ > 0, there is an instance with identical resources such that
min
N∈N
C(N) ≤ 3
5
(1 + ǫ) max
N∈N
C(N).
(The weights and number of tasks in this constructed instance are allowed to depend upon ǫ.)
Proof: The number of tasks n is equal to 6M+13 where M = ⌈2ǫ ⌉. T will denote a set of tasks consisting
of 6 tasks of weight 3M , 6 tasks of weight 6M , and 6M + 1 tasks of weight 1. In this case R consists of 6
resources. Let N (1) be the following Nash assignment:
Resource Tasks/Resource Cost/Resource
1 6M + 1 tasks, each of weight 1 6M + 1
2, 3, 4 2 tasks, each of weight 6M 12M
5, 6 3 tasks, each of weight 3M 9M
Then C(N (1)) = (6M +1) · (6M +1)+6 ·12M +6 ·9M = 36M2+138M +1. Let N (2) be the following
Nash assignment:
Resource Tasks/Resource Cost/Resource
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1 task of weight 6M ; 1 task of weight 3M ; M tasks of weight 1 10M
6 1 task of weight 6M ; 1 task of weight 3M ; M + 1 tasks of weight 1 10M + 1
In this case we have C(N (2)) ≥ n · 10M = (6M + 13)10M .
minN∈N C(N)
maxN∈N C(N)
≤ C(N
(1))
C(N (2))
≤ 36M
2 + 138M + 1
10M(6M + 13)
≤ 3
5
(
1+
11
6M + 13
)
≤ 3
5
(
1+
11
12
ǫ + 13
)
≤ 3
5
(1+ǫ)
✷
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4 Tasks with Identical Weights
In this section, we turn our attention to instances in which the weights of the tasks are identical, but the
delays may be diverse. Section 4.1 is algorithmic in nature. There, we present an algorithm that constructs
a lowest-cost assignment and an algorithm for finding a Nash assignment with lowest possible cost. In
Section 4.2, we compare the cost of Nash assignments to the cost of the best-possible assignment and we
compare the cost of the best Nash assignment to the cost of the worst. The comparisons use structural
observations arising from the algorithms in Section 4.1.
Definitions: Without loss of generality, we assume that each task has unit weight. Recall that d1 ≤
d2 ≤ · · · ≤ dm. In this section, we use alternative notation to represent an assignment. In particular, an
assignment will be denoted as n = 〈n1, . . . , nm〉, where nℓ is the number of tasks assigned to resource ℓ.
Thus L(ℓ, n) = nℓdℓ and C(n) =
∑
ℓ(n
2
ℓdℓ). Note that an assignment n is a Nash assignment if and only if
nidi ≤ (nj + 1)dj for all i, j.
4.1 Algorithmic Results
We start with a structural observation about lowest-cost assignments.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that n is a lowest-cost assignment for problem instance (T,R). Let (T ′, R) be the
problem instance derived from (T,R) by adding one task. Let k be any resource that minimizes the quantity
(2nk + 1)dk . Let ψ be the assignment for (T ′, R) which agrees with n except that ψk = nk + 1. Then ψ is
a lowest-cost assignment for (T ′, R).
Proof: We first argue that the problem instance (T ′, R) has a lowest-cost assignment ν with νk ≥ ψk.
To see this, suppose that σ is a lowest-cost assignment for (T ′, R) with σk < ψk. Let j be a resource with
σj > ψj . Let ν be the assignment for (T ′, R) that agrees with σ except that νk = σk + 1 and νj = σj − 1.
Then
C(ν) = C(σ) + ((σk + 1)
2 − σ2k)dk + ((σj − 1)2 − σ2j )dj
= C(σ) + (2σk + 1)dk − (2σj − 1)dj
≤ C(σ) + (2nk + 1)dk − (2σj − 1)dj (7)
≤ C(σ) + (2nj + 1)dj − (2σj − 1)dj (8)
≤ C(σ) + (2nj + 1)dj − (2nj + 1)dj (9)
= C(σ),
where (7) follows from the upper bound on σk, (8) comes from the choice of k, and (9) comes from the
choice of j. So by iterating the above argument, we can take ν to be a lowest-cost assignment for (T ′, R)
satisfying νk ≥ ψk.
Suppose now that C(ν) < C(ψ). Let y be the assignment for (T,R) that agrees with ν on resources
ℓ 6= k and has yk = νk − 1. Then
C(ψ) = C(n) + (ψ2k − n2k)dk ≤ C(y) + (ψ2k − n2k)dk
= C(y) + (2nk + 1)dk ≤ C(y) + (2νk − 1)dk = C(y) + (ν2k − (νk − 1)2)dk = C(ν),
where the first inequality follows from the optimality of n, giving a contradiction to our assumption on the
costs of ν and ψ. Therefore ψ is a lowest-cost assignment for (T ′, R). ✷
Theorem 4.2 follows directly from Lemma 4.1.
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Theorem 4.2 Let (T,R) be a problem instance with n ≥ 1 tasks and m resources. Algorithm FindOpt
(see Figure 1) constructs a lowest-cost assignment for (T,R) in O(nm) time.
FindOpt(T,R)
1. Set ni = 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m.
2. For τ = 1, . . . , n
(a) Choose a resource k so as to minimize (2nk + 1)dk .
(b) Increment nk.
3. Return n, which is a lowest-cost assignment for (T,R).
Figure 1: An algorithm for constructing a lowest-cost assignment for a problem instance (T,R) with n ≥ 1
tasks and m resources.
If n = Ω(m) then the algorithm can be sped up to O(n logm) by using, for example, a heap to store the
queue of resources. A similar improvement can be made to algorithm FindOptNash, which follows. The
following lemmas give information about the structure of Nash assignments.
Lemma 4.3 If ν ∈ N (T,R) and ρ ∈ N (T,R) then, for any j ∈ R, |νj − ρj | ≤ 1.
Proof: Suppose ρℓ > νℓ. Let k be a resource such that ρk < νk. Then since ρ and ν are Nash assignments,
ρℓdℓ ≤ (ρk + 1)dk ≤ νkdk ≤ (νℓ + 1)dℓ, so ρℓ ≤ νℓ + 1. ✷
Lemma 4.4 Suppose n ∈ N (T,R). If ni > nj then di ≤ dj .
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that ni > nj and di > dj . Then (nj + 1)dj < nidi, so n is not a Nash
assignment. ✷
FindOptNash(T,R)
1. Set ni = 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m.
2. For τ = 1, . . . , n
(a) Let K be the set of resources k that minimize (nk + 1)dk .
(b) Choose k ∈ K so as to minimize nk.
(c) Increment nk.
3. Return n, which is a lowest-cost assignment in N (T,R).
Figure 2: An algorithm for constructing a lowest-cost Nash assignment for a problem instance (T,R) with
n ≥ 1 tasks and m resources.
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Theorem 4.5 Let (T,R) be a problem instance with n ≥ 1 tasks and m resources. Algorithm FindOpt-
Nash (see Figure 2) constructs a lowest-cost assignment in N (T,R) in O(nm) time.
Proof: First note that the algorithm maintains the invariant that the assignment for tasks 1, . . . , j on
resources inR is a Nash assignment. This follows from the fact that k is chosen so as to minimize (nk+1)dk.
We prove by induction on n that the constructed assignment has lowest cost amongst Nash assignments. The
base case is n = 1. For the inductive step, let n be the (optimal) Nash assignment for a problem instance
(T,R) with n tasks constructed by the algorithm. Derive (T ′, R) from (T,R) by adding one task. Let ν be
the assignment constructed by FindOptNash(T’,R). Let i be the resource such that νi = ni + 1. Suppose
for contradiction that ρ ∈ N (T ′, R) satisfies C(ρ) < C(ν). By Lemma 4.3, there are three cases.
Case 1: ρi = νi = ni + 1
Since C(ρ) < C(ν) there are resources j and ℓ in R such that ρj = νj − 1 and ρℓ = νℓ + 1 and
ρ2jdj + ρ
2
ℓdℓ < ν
2
j dj + ν
2
ℓ dℓ = n
2
jdj + n
2
ℓdℓ. (10)
Let ψ be the assignment constructed by the algorithm just before the njth task is assigned to resource j.
Then
(ψℓ + 1)dℓ ≤ (nℓ + 1)dℓ = ρℓdℓ ≤ (ρj + 1)dj = njdj = (ψj + 1)dj , (11)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that ρ is a Nash assignment. Because the algorithm chose
resource j rather than resource ℓ, all of the inequalities in Equation (11) are equalities so
njdj = (nℓ + 1)dℓ. (12)
Furthermore, by step 2b of the algorithm, ψj ≤ ψℓ so nj − 1 = ψj ≤ ψℓ ≤ nℓ which, together with
Equation (12) implies
dj ≥ dℓ. (13)
Finally, the following calculation contradicts Equation (10).
ρ2jdj + ρ
2
ℓdℓ = (nj − 1)2dj + (nℓ + 1)2dℓ
= n2jdj + n
2
ℓdℓ + (2nℓ + 1)dℓ − (2nj − 1)dj
= n2jdj + n
2
ℓdℓ + 2(nℓ + 1)dℓ − (2nj − 1)dj − dℓ
= n2jdj + n
2
ℓdℓ + 2njdj − (2nj − 1)dj − dℓ
≥ n2jdj + n2ℓdℓ.
The final equality follows from (12) and the inequality follows from (13).
Case 2: ρi = νi − 1 = ni
We will construct an assignment σ ∈ N (T ′, R) with C(σ) ≤ C(ρ) and σi = νi. Case 1 then applies to σ.
Let j be a resource with ρj > νj , so by Lemma 4.3 ρj = νj + 1. Since ν is a Nash assignment,
(ni + 1)di = νidi ≤ (νj + 1)dj = (nj + 1)dj . (14)
Since ρ is a Nash assignment,
(nj + 1)dj = ρjdj ≤ (ρi + 1)di = νidi = (ni + 1)di. (15)
Inequalities (14) and (15) together imply
(ni + 1)di = (nj + 1)dj (16)
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and
(ρi + 1)di = ρjdj . (17)
Since the algorithm chose to assign the last task in (T ′, R) to resource i rather to resource j (in step 2b), we
have ni ≤ nj . Lemma 4.4 and Equation (16) imply that di ≥ dj .
Let σ be the assignment that agrees with ρ except σi = ρi + 1 and σj = ρj − 1. Equation (17) implies
the following facts since ρ is a Nash assignment.
1. for ℓ 6∈ {i, j}, (ρi + 1)di = ρjdj ≤ (ρℓ + 1)dℓ,
2. for ℓ 6∈ {i, j}, ρjdj = (ρi + 1)di ≥ ρℓdℓ.
The first of these implies that σidi ≤ (σℓ + 1)dℓ and the second implies that (σj + 1)dj ≥ σℓdℓ for all ℓ.
Thus, σ is a Nash assignment. The argument that C(σ) ≤ C(ρ) is exactly the same as the end of Case 1.
C(σ)− C(ρ) = (σ2i − ρ2i )di + (σ2j − ρ2j)dj
= (2ρi + 1)di − (2ρj − 1)dj
= 2ρjdj − di − (2ρj − 1)dj
= −di + dj
≤ 0,
where the second-to-last equality uses Equation (17).
Case 3: ρi = νi + 1 = ni + 2
As in Case 2, we construct an assignment σ ∈ N (T ′, R) with C(σ) ≤ C(ρ) and σi = νi. The argument
is similar to Case 2, but is included for completeness. Let j be a resource with ρj < νj , so by Lemma 4.3
ρj = νj − 1. Since ν is a Nash assignment,
njdj = νjdj ≤ (νi + 1)di = (ni + 2)di. (18)
Since ρ is a Nash assignment,
(ni + 2)di = ρidi ≤ (ρj + 1)dj = njdj . (19)
Inequalities (18) and (19) together imply
(ni + 2)di = ρidi = (ρj + 1)dj = njdj . (20)
Let σ be the assignment that agrees with ρ except σi = ρi − 1 and σj = ρj + 1. Equation (20) implies
the following facts since ρ is a Nash assignment.
1. for ℓ 6∈ {i, j}, (ρj + 1)dj = ρidi ≤ (ρℓ + 1)dℓ,
2. for ℓ 6∈ {i, j}, ρidi = (ρj + 1)dj ≥ ρℓdℓ.
The first of these implies that σjdj ≤ (σℓ + 1)dℓ and the second implies that (σi + 1)di ≥ σℓdℓ. Thus, σ is
a Nash assignment. Finally,
C(σ)− C(ρ) = (σ2i − ρ2i )di + (σ2j − ρ2j )dj
= ((ni + 1)
2 − (ni + 2)2)di + (n2j − (nj − 1)2)dj
= (2nj − 1)dj − (2ni + 3)di
= njdj + (nj − 1)dj − (ni + 2)di − (ni + 1)di
= (nj − 1)dj − (ni + 1)di
≤ njdj − (ni + 1)di
≤ 0,
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since n is a Nash assignment. Note that we use Equation (20) in the last equality.
From the three cases together we see that the algorithm FindOptNash indeed finds an optimal Nash
assignment. ✷
4.2 Comparison of Optimal and Nash Costs
Our first result shows that even for identical tasks the minimum cost of a Nash assignment can be larger then
the optimal cost.
Lemma 4.6 With identical task weights, for all ǫ > 0 there is an instance for which
min
N∈N
C(N) ≥
(
4
3
− ǫ
)
min
A∈A
C(A).
Proof: Consider the instance with m = 2, d1 = 1/2, d2 = (1 + ǫ), n = 2, w1 = 1 and w2 = 1. There
are three assignments. The assignment n = 〈2, 0〉 has L(1, n) = 1 and C(n) = 2. This assignment is a
Nash assignment, because moving one of the tasks to resource 2 would give it a new load of 1 + ǫ. The
assignment ρ = 〈1, 1〉 has L(1, ρ) = (1/2), L(2, ρ) = 1 + ǫ and C(ρ) = 1.5 + ǫ. This assignment is not a
Nash assignment, because the task on resource 2 could move to resource 1 for a new load of 1. Finally, the
assignment ψ = 〈0, 2〉 has L(2, ψ) = 2(1 + ǫ). It is not a Nash assignment, because either task could move
to resource 1 for a new load of 1/2. Thus, n is the only member of N and
C(n) ≥
(
2
1.5 + ǫ
)
min
A∈A
C(A) ≥
(
4
3
− ǫ
)
min
A∈A
C(A).
✷
In the example from the proof of Lemma 4.6 there is only one Nash assignment, and its cost is almost 4/3
times the cost of the best assignment. If we do the same construction with ǫ = 0, we obtain an instance
with two different Nash equilibria that differ in cost from each other by a factor 4/3. The following theorem
shows that 4/3 is in fact the largest ratio obtainable between alternative Nash equilibria for any problem
instance where task weights are identical.
Theorem 4.7 Suppose the tasks weights are identical. For the ratio between the lowest-cost Nash assign-
ment and the highest-cost Nash assignments we have
max
N∈N
C(N) ≤ 4
3
min
N∈N
C(N).
Proof: Suppose that n and ρ are distinct assignments in N (T,R). Suppose that ℓ is a resource for which
nℓ > ρℓ. By Lemma 4.3, nℓ = ρℓ+1. Also, there is a resource ℓ′ for which nℓ′ < ρℓ′ . Again, by Lemma 4.3,
nℓ′ + 1 = ρℓ′ . We will show that
ρ2ℓdℓ + ρ
2
ℓ′dℓ′ ≤
4
3
(
n2ℓdℓ + n
2
ℓ′dℓ′
)
, (21)
which proves the theorem since the resources on which n and ρ differ can be partitioned into pairs such as
the pair ℓ, ℓ′. Now
ρ2ℓdℓ + ρ
2
ℓ′dℓ′ = (nℓ − 1)2dℓ + (nℓ′ + 1)2dℓ′ . (22)
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Since n is a Nash assignment, dℓnℓ ≤ dℓ′(nℓ′ + 1) = dℓ′ρℓ′ and since ρ is a Nash assignment, dℓ′ρℓ′ ≤
dℓ(ρℓ + 1) = dℓnℓ so dℓnℓ = dℓ′ρℓ′ . Now if nℓ′ = 0 then the right-hand side of (22) is
(nℓ − 1)2dℓ + (nℓ′ + 1)dℓ′ = (nℓ − 1)2dℓ + ρℓ′dℓ′ = (nℓ − 1)2dℓ + nℓdℓ ≤ n2ℓdℓ,
so (21) holds. So suppose that nℓ′ ≥ 1. Note that, for any A ≥ 1, the right-hand side of (22) is at most
A
(
(nℓ − 1)nℓdℓ + nℓ
′ + 1
A
(nℓ′ + 1)dℓ′
)
.
We will choose A = (n2ℓ′ + 2nℓ′ + 1)/(n2ℓ′ + nℓ′ + 1) so (nℓ′ + 1)/A = 1 + n2ℓ′/(nℓ′ + 1). Plugging this
in, we get that the right-hand side of (22) is at most
A
(
(nℓ − 1)nℓdℓ + (nℓ′ + 1)dℓ′ + n2ℓ′dℓ′
)
= A
(
(nℓ − 1)nℓdℓ + nℓdℓ + n2ℓ′dℓ′
)
= A
(
n2ℓdℓ + n
2
ℓ′dℓ′
)
.
Equation (21) follows from the observation that A ≤ 4/3 for every nℓ′ ≥ 1. ✷
5 Finding Optima with Dynamic Programming
In [6], the authors present a polynomial time greedy algorithm for computing a Nash assignment for the L∞
cost function. The algorithm works as follows. It considers each of the tasks in the order of non-increasing
weights and assigns them to the resource that minimized their delay.
In this last section we give dynamic programming algorithms that find minimum-cost assignments for the
various special cases that we have studied. These algorithms extend from the identical tasks (respectively,
identical resources) case to the case where there are O(1) distinct values that may be taken by the task
weights (respectively, resource delays). The algorithms extend to give approximation schemes for the case
where there is a O(1) bound on the ratio between the largest and smallest task weights (respectively, largest
to smallest delays), as studied in Theorem 2.5.
Lemma 5.1 There exists an optimal assignment in which the set R of resources can be ordered in such a
way that if i ∈ R precedes j ∈ R, then all tasks assigned to i have weight less than or equal to all tasks
assigned to j.
Proof: Suppose that we have an assignment A where the resources cannot be ordered in this way. Then
there exist two resources i and j, with two tasks assigned to i having weights w and w′, and a task assigned
to j with weight w′′, such that w < w′′ < w′. Let ni and nj be the numbers of tasks assigned to i and j
respectively, and let di and dj be their delays. Let Wi = L(i, A)/di and Wj = L(j,A)/dj . The total cost
of tasks assigned to i and j is Winidi +Wjnjdj .
In the following we consider 3 cases. If nidi > njdj then we may exchange the tasks with weights w′′
and w′ to reduce the social cost C(A) (the operation reduces Wi by w′−w′′ and increases Wj by w′−w′′).
If nidi < njdj then we may exchange the tasks with weights w and w′′ to reduce C(A). In both cases A is
suboptimal.
If nidi = njdj we may make either exchange since they both leave the social cost unchanged. In the
following we build up the order iteratively and assume that all occurrences of case 1 and case 2 are already
eliminated. Suppose we have any optimal assignment and that some subset of the resources have been
placed in order, say R1 <= R2 <= · · · <= Rc. Consider adding another of the resources to the order that
we are constructing. Perhaps the new resource, R, is greater than the ordered resources R1,≤, Ra−1 but it
cannot be placed either below or above resource Ra. This is because Ra has tasks w and w′ and resource R
has task w′′ with w < w′′ < w′ as above. Since the assignment is optimal, we are in the case nidi = njdj
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from above, and we can exchange w′′ with w′. This leaves the order of the original subset, R1, . . . , Rc,
unchanged. We continue this process until R has bigger tasks, and then we can continue adding it to the
order.
✷
Theorem 5.2 Suppose that m resources have unit delay. Then an optimal assignment of n tasks with arbi-
trary weights to those resources may be found in time O(n2m).
Proof: We may order the task weights so that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . wn. Let Cj,k be the cost of an optimal
assignment of tasks with weights w1, . . . , wj to resources r1, . . . , rk . We want to compute the quantity
Cn,m.
Lemma 5.1 guarantees an optimal assignment of the tasks to a set of resources that will assign the ℓ
lowest-weight tasks to some resource, for some value of ℓ. Cj,k may be found by, for each ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , j},
assign tasks with weights wj+1−ℓ, . . . , wj to resource rk.
Cj,k = min
ℓ∈{0,1,2,...,j}
(
Cj−ℓ,k−1 + ℓ · (wj+1−ℓ + . . .+ wj)
)
.
Cn,m can be found using a dynamic programming table of size O(nm) each of whose entries is com-
puted in time O(n). ✷
The above dynamic program extends to the case where delays may belong to a set of O(1) elements
{d1, . . . , dα} where α is a constant. Let mℓ be the number of resources with delay dℓ, so that m = m1 +
. . .+mα.
Let Cj,k1,k2,...kα be the cost of an optimal assignment of tasks with weights w1, . . . , wj to a set of
resources containing kℓ resources with delay dℓ, for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , α. Lemma 5.1 guarantees an optimal
assignment that will (for some ℓ and ℓ′) assign the ℓ lowest weight tasks to some resource with delay dℓ′ ,
provided kℓ′ > 0.
Cj,k1,k2,...kα = min
ℓ∈{0,1,2,...,j};ℓ′∈{1,2,...,α}with kℓ′ > 0
(
Cj−ℓ,k1,k2,...,kℓ′−1,...,kα + ℓ ·dℓ′ · (wj+1−ℓ+ . . .+wj)
)
.
The dynamic programming table has size O(nmα) and each entry is computed in time O(n).
The following theorem generalises the algorithm FindOpt to the case where there is an O(1) bound on
the number of distinct values taken by task weights.
Theorem 5.3 Let weights w1, . . . , wn take values in {w′1, . . . , w′α}. Let nℓ be the number of tasks with
weight w′ℓ, so that n = n1 + . . .+ nα. Given delays d1 ≤ d2 ≤ . . . dm, we may find an optimal assignment
in time O(mn2α).
Proof: Let Ck,j1,...,jα be the cost of an optimal assignment to resources with delays d1, . . . , dk of a set of
tasks containing jℓ tasks of weight w′ℓ, for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , α. For x ∈ N, let [x] denote the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , x}.
Ck,j1,j2,...,jα = min
j′
1
∈[j1];j′2∈[j2];...;j′α∈[jα]
(
Ck−1,j1−j′1,...,jα−j′α +(j
′
1 + . . .+ j
′
α) · dk · (w′1 · j′1 + . . .+w′α · j′α)
)
.
There are O(mnα) entries in the dynamic programming table, and each entry is computed in time O(nα).
✷
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The above algorithm can be used to obtain an approximation scheme for the case where there is a bound
on the ratio of maximum to minimum weights, as studied in Theorem 2.5. Assume the weights are indexed
in non-ascending order, w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn and the ratio w1/wn is upper-bounded by some pre-set limit
α.
Let ǫ ≤ 1 be the desired accuracy. Choose k such that (w1/wn)1/k ≤ 1+ǫ. Take each weight and round
it up to the nearest value of wn · (w1/wn)t/k where t is as small as possible in {0, . . . , k}. The new weights
take k + 1 distinct values. An optimal assignment for the new weights has cost at most 1 + ǫ times the cost
of an optimal assignment for the old weights, since each weight has increased by at most a factor 1 + ǫ.
In this special case of fixed ratio of largest to smallest task weight, k depends only on ǫ, and the resulting
algorithm has run time O(mn2k) where k = O(ǫ−1 ln(w1/wn)).
The dynamic programming algorithm of Theorem 5.2 can be used in exactly the same way to obtain
an approximation scheme subject to a fixed limit on the ratio of largest to smallest delay. The details are
omitted.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies a very general resource allocation problem. We are given a collection of resources each of
which is associated with a “delay” and a collection of tasks, each given with a weight. We assume that each
task chooses its resource in a selfish manner, minimizing its own cost, and we are interested in determining
the social cost of this selfish behavior. Previous work on this problem has measured “social cost” in terms of
the L∞ metric – that is, the longest delay incurred by any task. Our measure of social cost is the L1 metric
– that is, the average delay (over tasks).
We give bounds on the size of the coordination ratio; we also study the algorithmic problem of finding
optimal (lowest-cost) assignments. For the case of identical resources or identical tasks we obtain bounds
on the ratio between alternative Nash equilibria.
Our results show that the L1 metric behaves very differently to the L∞ metric. In the case of the
L∞ metric, there always exists an optimal assignment that is also Nash, but the costs of different Nash
assignments can differ a lot. In the case of the L1 metric, the costs of any optimal assignment and the cost
of the minimum-cost Nash assignment can be arbitrarily far away from each other, but in a lot of cases the
costs of different Nash assignments can differ only by a constant factor.
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